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Bidders & Targets: Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. By Leo
Herzel and Richard W. Shepro. Basil Blackwell, 1990. Pp. x, 523.
David T. Brown*
Bidders & Targets: Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. is an
exhaustive treatment of both the law and economics of takeovers. Its
self-contained text and technical appendixes make it accessible to both
beginners and experts. Additionally, the book is extremely current.
For example, it contains a lengthy discussion of the Time-Warner
agreement which was not completed until late 1989.
The authors, who have worked extensively as legal counsel in
takeover contests, divide the book into three parts. Part one describes
the current takeover market and how it evolved into its present state,
beginning by explaining the legal rights and the economic incentives
of directors, shareholders and CEO's. The authors argue that the key
role of the directors of the target company is to increase the bargaining
power of shareholders. Disorganized shareholders cannot effectively
bargain with the bidder especially when faced with a coercive two-tier
bid. The author's also discuss the role of anti-takeover charter amendments in overcoming the problems which diffuse shareholders face.
Unfortunately, managers may claim to fight an offer because it is
inadequate when they actually are attempting to save their own jobs.
Traditionally, there has been little legal recourse against target directors. However, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,1 referred to as the "Trans
Union" case, the Delaware courts took large steps toward weakening
the business judgment rule. The authors provide a lengthy discussion
of the implications of this landmark case.
The authors argue in favor of increased scrutiny by institutional
investors, and rules which are designed to give shareholders more
power over directors. For example, they argue that shareholders of
acquiring firms should be required to approve cash and stock offers.
Currently, exchange rules only require shareholder approval for stock
offers.
Part one continues with a discussion of state and federal takeover
laws providing a thoughtful discussion of the (1) legislative intent of
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the laws, (2) political forces that shape the evolving legal climate and
(3) potential impact the Reagan appointees to the Supreme Court may
have on future litigation over state anti-takeover laws. The authors
argue that state takeover statutes tip the legal playing field in favor
of targets. Since the takeover boom in the 1960s, many states have
acted to protect firms incorporated in their state from hostile takeovers. The authors state that the "first generation" anti-takeover statutes
typically required state approval of hostile acquisitions. These laws
were held unconstitutional in Edgar v. Mite Corp.,2 on the grounds
that they unreasonably interfered with federal tender offer regulation
and interstate commerce.
The resulting "second generation" statutes have mandated strict
modifications of the required majorities for approval of acquisitions of
companies in particular states. These laws were recently upheld in
CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America.3 While these laws clearly violate
the spirit of Federal laws, in particular the Williams Act 4 which governs tender offers, the authors argue that the second generation statutes are quite safe given the unwillingness of the current Supreme
Court to interfere with state takeover legislation.
The authors see very little recent change in federal corporate
takeover law. The only recent change in the role of the federal government has been a realization of the antitrust standards for approval of
horizontal mergers. Part one ends with a complete discussion of various
strategies available in corporate control battles including lock-ups,
poison pills, squeeze-outs and leveraged buyouts.
The first part of the book is outstanding. The authors distill many
complex economic arguments about the incentives of shareholders and
managers into an understandable form. Further, they provide a complete discussion of the scientific evidence on these issues gathered by
economists. The authors highlight their arguments by a discussion of
the applicable law, theoretical economics, scientific evidence and examples from specific transactions.
Part two of the book is titled "Advice for Bidders and Targets."
In the introduction, the authors describe this section as "strategic and
advisory." The strategies discussed are well developed extensions of
the concepts discussed in part one. As a result, this section is both
advisory to executives and valuable to other readers. The questions
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that are discussed in this section include "friendly deals, what good
is a contract?, should I make a hostile bid?," and "how should we
defend against a hostile bid?"
The authors identify the key issue for takeover bidders as avoiding
competition from other bidders. Competitive auctions typically result
in the bidder paying an inflated price for the target, and thus, the
key to avoiding competition is to move quickly when making a bid.
Further, the authors point out that the winning bidder in a competitive
contest should be aware of the "winner's curse," that is the tendency
for the highest bidder in any auction to pay more than the object is
really worth. In the authors words, "[a] successful bidder may be a

loser. '5
Part three includes a detailed discussion of the Time-Warner deal.
This transaction is rich enough to demonstrate many of the concepts
developed earlier in the book. The authors incorporate nearly all of
the documents filed during this acquisition, thus giving the reader a
good feel for many of the legal technicalities that are critical to a
successful outcome.
Finally, the book contains a one hundred page appendix that details
the federal securities laws and Delaware and New York state laws
that pertain to acquisitions.
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